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Abstract 
Nation’s immunity from the jurisdiction of other nations’ Courts has been recognized and codified by many 
nations under the term of ‘Sovereign States Immunity’. But, States still have to emphasize on the scope of this 
immunity in order to prevent conflicts of States’ sovereignty from enjoyment of other States immunity on their 
territory. Thus, many nations have provided for a ‘restrictive immunity’ in their domestic law. Following the 
path of these nations, the 2004 UNCSI has also provided for a ‘restrictive immunity’. However, the 1982 
UNCLOS has addressed the issue of Sovereign State Immunity too. Surprisingly or interestingly, the 
interpretation of UNCLOS Article 32 by ITLOS in Libertad Case demonstrates that unlike to many pretentions 
or understandings, UNCLOS provides Sovereign States for an ‘absolute immunity’ for warships. This paper will 
try to find out some justifications for ITLOS’s position before coming to the conclusion that rather than a 
creative role, ITLOS played its role of interpretation. 
Keywords: Sovereign State Immunity; Warship; Restrictive immunity; Absolute immunity; ITLOS. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rather than mere grace, comity, or usage, centuries ago Sovereign State Immunity has gradually been developed 
in the way that it occupies a remarkable place in international law today. From mere civilities of friendly 
relationship between States, Sovereign State Immunity has started to be considered, organized and codified in 
different national laws and legislations. This consideration has then attracted attentions from international legal 
institutions and international community in general so that they finally negotiated a convention which governs 
issues of States immunity. Thus, after decades of controversies about the issues of State Immunity, the United 
Nations International Law Commission (ILC) in order to bridge formidable cleavages during a period of rapid 
changes in State practices concerning sovereign immunity finalized the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their properties (the 2004 UNCSI). Unfortunately, to date, the 2004 UNCSI has 
attracted little support as an international treaty, and thus one must ask whether it has any significance as 
evidence of an evolving customary international law of sovereign immunity. Moreover, similarly like many 
domestic laws on State Immunity, the 2004 UNCSI provides for a ‘restrictive immunity’ whereas the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea provides for ‘absolute immunity’. This point of views may fit with the one 
shared by the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Libertad case involving Argentina 
against Ghana on the issues of application of Sovereign State Immunity to the Argentina warship arrested by 
Ghana in its internal water. 
In this case, although the key issue was the fact that the two states disputed whether article 32 on the 
sovereign immunity of warships applied to such vessels while in the internal waters of a state, the issue of waiver 
has been voluntarily ignored by ITLOS. Unlike to Ghanain High Court, the ITLOS after having ignored the 2004 
UNCSI and strictly relying on UNCLOS, though it does not contain a section directly addressing the issue of a 
waiver of enforcement immunity in connection with warships, came to the conclusion that “a warship is an 
expression of the sovereignty of the State whose flag it flies” and “in accordance with general international law, 
a warship enjoys immunity, including in internal waters”. A finding which although surprising can be justified 
since it has the merit to provide for interpretation of UNCLOS provisions. Very interestingly, through ITLOS’s 
decision, can we say that ‘a warship’s immunity under UNCLOS says more than we think?’ ITLOS, in deserving 
an ‘absolute immunity’ rather than a ‘restrictive immunity’ didn’t move a little bit far from its interpretative role 
to a creative role? Can we justify ITLOS’s ignorance on the issue of waiver in this case? 
In order to handle the puzzles left by ITLOS’s decision in Libertad case, this essay will try to find out 
some conceptional definitions of the principle of Sovereign State Immunity. Then, it will focus on the 
development of this principle from domestic laws to customary international law. Finally, some analysis of 
ITLOS’s decision on Libertad case will provide us for some implications of this principle under UNCLOS in 
order to show us that ITLOS did remain in its interpretative role in Libertad case. 
 
2. Concept of Sovereign State immunity 
Traditionally Sovereign State Immunity is known as a doctrine precluding the institution of a suit against the 
sovereign government without its consent. Though commonly believed to be rooted in English law, it is actually 
rooted in the inherent nature of power and the ability of those who hold power to shield themselves. In England 
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it was predicated on the concept that ‘the sovereign can do no wrong’. However, since the American Revolution 
explicitly rejected this idea, the American rulers had to come up with another rationale to protect their power. 
One they came up with is that the ‘sovereign is exempt from suit on the practical ground that there can be no 
legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Many nations have followed the 
example of these two States so that the customary character of the principle of Sovereign State Immunity can’t 
be rejected in international law. 
 
2.1. Definition  
The term ‘immunity’ is defined by The Oxford Companion to Law as a state of freedom from certain legal 
consequences or the operation of certain legal rules. In municipal law for particular reasons particular categories 
of persons are immune from civil or criminal liability in particular cases. Thus young children are immune from 
criminal liability. In the same way, foreign sovereigns and the governments of foreign states have immunity 
from the jurisdiction of municipal courts in other states.
1
 Sovereign immunity can be referred to ‘act of State 
doctrine’ which is a domestic doctrine of judicial self-restraint whereby domestic courts will refrain from 
judging the acts of a foreign sovereign done in his own territory. In other words, it is a form of non-justiciability. 
As such, we can say that sovereign State immunity precludes a claim or defence that relies upon an assertion that 
a foreign official act was illegal under foreign law.  In fact, State immunity which acts as a bar to the civil and 
administrative jurisdiction of States when faced with claims against foreign States has uncertain legal origins. It 
is often contended that State immunity arose out of the principles of independence, equality and dignity of 
States.
2
 However, this assertion has been authoritatively challenged
3
 and the alternative explanation put forward 
that State immunity may be traced to foreign head of State immunity. Another explanation is that it arose out of 
tensions between two fundamental international law norms- sovereign equality and exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction.
4
 But, in these tensions, the maxim par in parem non habet imperium or sovereign equality seems to 
prevail. Applying this logic, Sucharitkul argues that the principle of State jurisdiction must give way to the 
principle of sovereign equality to effectuate a State’s right of immunity.
5
 This is also the view of the Institut de 
Droit International (IDI), when it opined that immunities ‘are conferred to ensure an orderly allocation and 
exercise of jurisdiction in accordance with international law in proceedings concerning States, to respect the 
sovereign equality of States and to permit the effective performance of the functions of persons who act on 
behalf of States’
6
 
Sovereign immunity is a shield, which prevents many types of legal action against foreign 
states.
7
There are two primary types of accepted sovereign immunity: (1) jurisdictional immunity and 2) 
enforcement immunity.
8
  Jurisdictional immunity refers to limitations on the adjudicatory power of national 
courts, particularly regarding whether a litigant may even properly file suit against a foreign State. While States 
originally took an “absolute” stance in regards to jurisdictional immunity that barred most types of legal actions 
against foreign sovereigns, in the twentieth century many courts shifted towards a less burdensome “restrictive 
jurisdictional immunity” system.
9
 Under this system, courts have been much more willing to entertain legal 
actions against foreign sovereigns.
10
 
This shift did not come quite as quickly for enforcement immunity. “Enforcement immunity” is an 
offshoot of jurisdictional immunity that prevents the property of a state from being taken in connection with an 
adjudicatory ruling.
11
 Enforcement immunity protects government property including “immovable, land, 
movable assets, and rights such as intellectual property, and bank accounts.”
12
 While jurisdictional immunity 
typically focuses on the nature of the action against the state, enforcement immunity tends to focus on the 
purpose of the property being examined in connection with a potential seizure. The limitations on enforcement 
immunity are, therefore, typically less “intrusive” than those of jurisdictional immunity, because they merely 
                                                           
1 The Oxford Companion to Law (1980), Walter M. David, see at 600. 
2 For an overview of this subject, see Hazel Fox QC, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: OUP, 2004).   
3 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Problems of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States”, 28 BYIL (1951), at 228  
4 See Lee M. Caplan, “ State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory”, 97 
AJIL, 741 (2003). 
5 Sompong Sucharitkul, “Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities”, 149 RJC 87 (1976 I), at 117-119. 
6 Edwards J. Kionka, Torts in a Nutshell, 2nd edn. (1992). At 341. 
7 Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 853, 857 (2010) 
8 Idem 
9 See August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity and Enforcement Measures, 17 EUR. J. INT’L 
LAW 803, 803-05 (2006) 
10 Idem 
11 Idem 
12  See Peter-Tobias Stoll, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, STATE IMMUNITY, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690e1106?rskey=W0Momt&result=1&q=state%20immunity&prd=EPIL 
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affect the remedies available as a result of a proceeding as opposed to considering whether a proceeding is 
appropriate at all.
1
 Recently there has been a trend toward courts taking a more lenient approach in connection 
with the seizure of state property, particularly state-owned commercial property and other types of government 
property that does not serve a “public” purpose. And this position holds its basis from national laws as well as 
some treaties in the issue of Sovereign States Immunity. 
 
2.2. Warships’ Sovereign Immunity as Customary International Law 
The practice of States and international judicial bodies proved that Sovereign Immunity is based upon customary 
international law. If customary international law can be summarized as treaties and domestic law, we can say 
that Sovereign immunity is a creature of both treaty and domestic law. 
Warships have long been considered immune from enforcement measures as evidenced by a number of 
multilateral treaties.
2
 The 1926 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the 
Immunity of State-Owned Vessels makes a distinction between normal State-owned ships and such State-owned 
ships that exclusively serve governmental non-commercial purposes, the later being immune from enforcement 
measures.
3
 Similarly, Both Article 22 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Article 32 of the 
UNCLOS provide for sovereign immunity. Warships and government vessels should comply with certain rules 
indicated by those conventions, but they do not derogate from the principle of sovereign immunity. If a warship 
does not abide by the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage in the territorial sea, the 
coastal State is not entitled to take any act of coercion and may only ask the ship to leave the territorial sea 
(Article 23 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Article 30 of the 
UNCLOS). In other words they are immune from the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State, even if they 
are not completely beyond its legislative/prescriptive jurisdiction when they navigate through waters falling 
under the competence of the coastal State. And, very interesting as it can also be surprising, this ITLOS stood for 
this position in Libertad Case. As far as the prevention of marine pollution is concerned, Article 236 of the 
UNCLOS exempts warships, naval auxiliary and government vessels from rules on the protection and 
preservation of marine environment. Also, the 1972 London Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter does not apply to ships entitled to sovereign immunity under international 
law. As far as the high seas are concerned, both the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (Article 8, para. 1) and 
the UNCLOS (Article 95) state that warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of 
any State other than the flag State. The same is true for ships owned by a State and operated only on government 
non-commercial service (Article 9 Geneva Convention on the High Seas; Article 96 UNCLOS). The principle of 
sovereign immunity is reflected in other sectors of international law. For example, the 1991 commentary to the 
ILC Draft Articles states property of a military character includes navy, air force and army property.
4
 Article 16 
of the 2004 UNCSI confirms the immunity from jurisdiction of a foreign State in relation to its warships, naval 
auxiliaries and government vessels (i.e. “vessels owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only 
on government non-commercial purposes”).
5
 The 2004 UNCSI has been identified as a “comprehensive legal 
instrument” that covers the issue of sovereign immunity for it provides measures of constraint in pre-judgment 
and post-judgment circumstances. For example, Article 19 provides that in post-judgment circumstances, such as 
the NML-Argentina dispute, the types of measures of constraint allowed are: (1) the state has “expressly 
consented to the taking of such measures as indicated;” (2) the parties have “allocated or earmarked property for 
the satisfaction of the claim; or (3) the property is in use for a “commercial purpose” by the government. 
Furthermore, Article 21 of the same Convention provides for immunity for non-commercial and related military 
property and the ‘ARA LIBERTAD’ can be considered as such. 
Thus, one may wonder why the ITLOS didn’t rely on such clear provisions to render its decision on 
NML-Argentina/ Ghana dispute. While talking about this Convention, we may not lose focus on its binding 
force, better we might question or reject its customary character in international law for it is still young. Not only 
is the Convention yet in force, but it has had relatively few adoptions to date; only twenty-eight states have 
signed and only eleven have ratified or acceded as of the symposium’s date. These numbers fall far short of what 
is typically considered reliable evidence that a treaty reflects customary international law binding on nonparties 
                                                           
1 See Reinisch, supra note 67, at 804.  
2 Crawford, Execution of Judgements and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AJIL, 820,862(1981). 
3 Art.1,Art.3, Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, 10 
April 1926, 176 LNTS 199. 
4 ILC Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2(2) YBILC 59 (1991), UN-Doc.A/46/10. 
5 See Article 16(2) of the 2004 UN Convention. The following examples are given in the Commentary by the ILC on Article 
16, para. 2 in relation to this category of vessels: police patrol boats, custom inspection boats, hospital ships, oceanographic 
ships, training vessels and dredgers, owned and operated by a State and used or intended for use in government non-
commercial service. 
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to the treaty.
1
 
States practices also evidence the customary character of State sovereign immunity although this 
concession is done under a restrictive approach. Accordingly, many States began to adhere to the doctrine of 
restrictive immunity, under which immunity was available as regards governmental activity, or termed as acts 
jure imperii, while immunity was not granted to a State in relation to its private or trade activity, or termed as 
acts jure gestionis.
2
 
We can find this in many domestic legislations such as United States Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 
1976;
3
 Australia Foreign State Immunity Act 1985;
4
 Canada State Immunity Act 1982;
5
 United Kingdom State 
Immunity Act 1978;
6
 Pakistan State Immunity Ordinance 1981;
7
 Singapore State Immunity Act 1985;
8
 South 
Africa Foreign States Immunities Act 1981
9
 and Ghana Shipping Act. 
10
 
As to national legislations, the FSIA of 1976 of the USA and State Immunity Act of 1978 of the UK, 
both adopting a restrictive approach, served as a model for the national legislations of other countries including 
Canada, Singapore, Australia, South African, Pakistan and Malaysia.
11
 In addition and prior to these 
legalizations, national courts accepted the doctrine of State immunity. For example, in 1812 and according to 
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v McFadden & Others a warship constitutes a part of the 
military force of her nation; acts under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him 
in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the 
interference of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take place without affecting his power and his dignity. 
The implied license therefore under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be construed, and it 
ought to be construed, as containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory 
she claims the rites of hospitality.
12
 No matter how subsequent commentators interpreted or framed The 
Schooner Exchange for their own purposes, this US judicial practice marks the beginning of the development of 
the modern law of State immunity. Moreover, from this practice, we could notice that the determination of the 
validity of a foreign official act is a political, rather than a legal, inquiry for which courts are ill-suited. The 
concern is that courts, by ruling on a case which has foreign policy issues, might embarrass the executive branch 
in its conduct of foreign relations and infringe upon its prerogatives in this area. Therefore, the act of State 
doctrine appropriately restricts courts to their traditional role as law interpreters rather than law makers, the latter 
being appropriately reserved to the executive and legislative branches. 
 
3. Foreign State Immunity to Warships or Absolute immunity to warships under UNCLOS  
Article 29 of UNCLOS defines a warship as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the 
external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer dully commissioned 
by the Government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent and 
manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline”. Coast guard vessels designated as such and 
under the command of a commissioned officer, are also considered to be “warships”. However, by Article 102 of 
UNCLOS, a vessel ceases being a “warship” if “acts of piracy” are committed by a mutinous crew and would 
thus be treated as acts committed by private ship. 
 
3.1. Immunity of a warship under  UNCLOS 
Unlike other issues at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the issue of immunity of 
warships did not engender any controversy and finds expression in various provisions of the convention; despite 
the acknowledgment of coastal states’ sovereignty in their territorial seas. Article 3 of UNCLOS provides for 12 
mile territorial sea for each coastal state and grants these states absolute sovereignty subject only to the right of 
innocent passage.
13
 The sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and 
                                                           
1 On the relationship of custom and treaties, see generally INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 118 21 
(Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009). 
2 M.N. SHAW, International Law (5th edin. 2003), 625. 
3 Section 1611(b)(2) 
4 Section 32(3)(a) 
5 Art. 12(3) 
6 Section 14(2)(3) 
7 Section 15(3) 
8 Section 16(3) 
9 Section 15(2) 
10 Section 392 
11 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, (2002), Chapter 5. 
12 See Sompong Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (1959), 7–8. 
13 UNCLOS, Art.17. 
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subsoil.
1
 As regards what constitutes innocent passage, the convention goes beyond merely specifying that it is 
passage that is not prejudicial to the security, peace and good order of the coastal state by specifying activities 
which when engaged in will be deemed to be non-innocent, and endows the coastal states with the power to 
enact appropriate legislation governing passage in the territorial sea. UNCLOS also confers civil and 
criminal jurisdiction on the coastal state. Article 21 of UNCLOS enjoins foreign ships navigating the waters of a 
coastal state to comply with all the rules and regulations of the coastal state and the relevant rules of international 
law. However, it exempts warships and other state vessels operated for non-commercial purposes from the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state.
2
 
Article 30 clearly expressed non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal 
State. According to this article, if any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State 
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is 
made to it, the coastal State may simply require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. Moreover, if that 
warship caused a damage to the coastal State, Article 31 requires that “the flag State shall bear international 
responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or 
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State 
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of 
international law”.  Article 30 and 31 are therefore some exceptions granted to warships from the jurisdiction of 
a coastal State in order to permit the officials on board of these ships to fulfill their mission like a diplomatic 
agent enjoys immunity in the host State where he is in mission. Likewise, in the Schooner Exchange case, the 
French government resisted the in rem libel action against the ship for recovery of their property, arguing that, as 
a ship of war, the Exchange was an arm of the emperor and was thus entitled to the same immunity privileges as 
the emperor himself.
3
 order to consolidate such immunity, Article 32 mentions that “nothing in this Convention 
(UNCLOS) affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial 
purposes”. 
It follows from these provisions that the doctrine of immunity of government ships is derived from the 
wider principle of jurisdictional immunity of sovereign states under traditional international law. It is 
the    immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction or execution in respect of its maritime property that entitles a 
state’s vessel to immunities while outside its waters. Therefore, through UNCLOS provisions, we can understand 
that warships enjoy ‘absolute immunity’ from the jurisdiction of a coastal state; and where a warship flouts the 
laws and regulations of a Coastal State, it cannot be arrested. The Convention only requires the offended state to 
require such an offending vessel to leave the territorial sea immediately. Whatever harm or damage caused a 
coastal state may be pursued through diplomatic channels or international proceedings. 
These conventional outcomes had motivated the ITLOS decision in LIBERTAD case. And even more, 
ITLOS findings in that case surprisingly went beyond the traditional scope of warship’s immunity when it 
explained that this immunity applied everywhere in the ocean portions including internal waters. 
 
3.2.  ITLOS in the “ARA LIBERTAD” CASE  
Relying on a particular provision of the Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA) and the bond documents that waived 
Argentina’s jurisdictional immunity,
4
 NML sought and obtained an injunction from the Commercial Division of 
the Accra Fast Tack High Court of Ghana detaining the Argentine Navy training vessel, the ARA Libertad, at the 
Tema Port, off of the coast of Ghana. Although the Ghanain Court did recognize the sovereign immunity of the 
Argentinian Navy training vessel, it contended that this immunity can be waived and has been already waived by 
the Republic of Argentina. Therefore, the Ghanaian court issued an order allowing NML to seize the ARA 
Libertad. 
Surprised by Ghanaian Court’s ruling, Argentina informed Ghana that it was submitting the dispute to 
the ITLOS under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Two weeks 
later, Argentina filed a request for provisional measures with the ITLOS.
5
 Thus, in order to claim a prima facie 
jurisdiction of the ITLOS, rather than a question of waiver of sovereign state immunity on warship, Argentina 
argued that the interpretation of UNCLOS Articles is the sole problem.
6
 The tribunal rejected three of the four 
                                                           
1 Ibid, Art.2 
2 Ibid Art. 30, 31 and 32. 
3 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) at 126-127. 
4 See Ghana Superior Court of Judicature, High Court of Justice Accra Commercial Division, 11/10/2012, “NML Capital Ltd. 
vrs Republic of Arg.,” (RPC/343/12) at 23. 
5  See Request for Prescription of Provisional Measures, Under Art. 290, para. 5, of UNCLOS (2012), available at 
http://www.itlos.org /fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20-Request_for_ official_website.pdf 
6 article 18(1)(b) on innocent passage in the territorial sea, article 32 on the sovereign immunity of warships and articles 
87(1)(a) and 90 on high seas freedom of navigation. 
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grounds
1
, but found that the dispute did, at least prima facie, concern the interpretation or application of article 
32.
2
  As far as it concerns provisional measures, Ghana’s temptations to refute the existence of the need for such 
measures have been rejected by the tribunal since there is the continuing serious prejudice to Argentina posed by 
Ghana’s refusal to permit the warship to depart its port. Thus, after observing that “a warship is an expression of 
the sovereignty of the State whose flag it flies”
3
 and “in accordance with general international law, a warship 
enjoys immunity, including in internal waters,
4
 the tribunal then concluded that “the urgency of the situation 
requires the prescription by the Tribunal of provisional measures that will ensure full compliance with the 
applicable rules of international law, thus preserving the respective rights of the Parties.”
5
  However, while 
focusing on the key issue of the dispute between Argentina and Ghana and ITLOS’s conclusion in this case, one 
could be surprised with the scope of State immunity of warships on the Sea as far as it concerns coastal States’ 
sovereignty under UNCLOS. This remark retains many attentions so that one may think that rather than 
interpretation, ITLOS innovates in extending States sovereignty of warships beyond territorial waters since 
according to ITLOS: 
Although article 32 is included in Part II of the Convention entitled ‘Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone,’ and most of the provisions in this Part relate to the territorial sea, some of the provisions in this Part may 
be applicable to all maritime areas, as in the case of the definition of warships provided for in article 29 of the 
Convention.
6
 
Unlike to a number of domestic law on State Immunity which provide a ‘restrictive immunity’, 
UNCLOS under the following phrasing of Article 32 “[…..,nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of 
warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.]’’ is impliedly providing States for 
an ‘absolute immunity’. And the ‘absolute’ character of the immunity suffices to apply this immunity 
everywhere on the Sea including ‘internal waters’ which are undisputable parts of the Sea. Thus, UNCLOS by 
providing an unlimited scope of application of State immunity differentiates itself from domestic laws on this 
matter and become the sole international convention which confers such immunity to States. Even the 2004 
UNCSI which has been identified as a “comprehensive legal instrument” doesn’t afford States for such a 
immunity since it followed the legislative path of existing domestic laws in providing States for a ‘restrictive 
immunity’. Moreover, since the disputing States are party to UNCLOS and not to the 2004 UNCSI, the ITLOS 
did well in preferring UNCLOS to 2004 UNCSI to handle the dispute. And even if the disputing States ratified 
the latter convention, it has no binding force since it hasn’t entered into force yet. However, UNCLOS bears the 
character of customary international and apprehended the issue of State immunity of warships which is also 
admitted as customary international law. Finally, considering that the Annex XII Arbitration tribunal’s role is to 
interpret and to apply UNCLOS,
7
 and that UNCLOS provides for implied ‘absolute immunity’ to States on their 
warships, we may understand that the ITLOS interpreted Article 32 of UNCLOS in the spirit of that provision 
rather than the provision itself. Therefore, rather than innovation, ITLOS achieved its goal in providing us for the 
broad meaning of that article. And, by behaving so, ITLOS hasn’t played a creative role. It rather sticks to its 
interpretative role. 
Another surprising behavior of ITLOS in this case is the ignorance of the waiver of immunity issue. In 
the LIBERTAD Case, could ITLOS tackle this issue through a surprising decision? 
 
4. Can we justify ITLOS attitude towards the issue of the waiver of States immunity? 
When we consider that Article 19(a) of the 2004 UN Convention on State Immunity,
8
 Article 23 of the European 
Convention on State Immunity,
9
 Article VIII(A) of the International Law Association’s Draft articles on a 
Convention on State Immunity,
10
 Article 5 of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on 
Contemporary Problems concerning the Immunity of States in Relation to Questions of Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement
11
 and also a wide range of domestic laws on States Immunity allowing for the possibilities to waive 
immunity from jurisdiction, we can say that Customary international law recognizes that a state may waive either 
                                                           
1 See M/V Saiga (No. 2) (Argentina v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, Para. 61. 
2 Ibid,Para. 65-67. 
3 Ibid, Para. 94. 
4 Ibid, Para. 95. 
5 Ibid, Para. 100. 
6 Ibid, Para. 64. 
7 UNCLOS, Art.287(1) 
8 See Article 19(1) of the 2004 UN Convention. 
9 See Art.23 of European Convention on State Immunity 1972,16 May 1972, ETS No. 74, Reprinted in 11 ILM 470, 1972. 
10  See Art. III(A), Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity, ILA, Report of the 66th Conference, (Buenos 
Aires, 14-20 August 1994). 
11 See Art. 5 of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on Contemporary Problems concerning the Immunity of 
States in Relation to Questions of Jurisdiction and Enforcement, 2 September 1991. 
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its jurisdictional or enforcement immunity (or sometimes both). In fact, a waiver of State needs the consent of 
the Defendant State. And this waiver can be obtained through international agreement, arbitration agreement, 
written contract, declaration before the court, or written communication after the dispute has arisen. Consent to 
measures of enforcement cannot be found from consent to jurisdiction; rather a separate express waiver of 
consent for enforcement measures is required.
1
 
Prior to ITLOS, It will be recalled that on 2 October 2012, whilst on an official visit, the Argentinean 
naval training vessel the ARA Libertad was arrested in the Ghanaian port of Tema.  Its arrest was ordered by 
Justice Richard Adjei Frimpong, sitting in the Commercial Division of the Accra High Court, on an application 
by NML to enforce a judgment against Argentina obtained in the US Courts. After looking to the 2004 UNSCI 
for guidance, the Ghanain judge considered that the waiver of immunity contained in Argentina’s FAA and bond 
documents, (which are at the heart of the dispute with NML) operated to lift the vessel’s immunity from 
execution. That waiver provides that: 
To the extent the Republic [of Argentina] or any of its revenues, assets or properties shall be 
entitled … to any immunity from suit, … from attachment prior to judgment, … from execution of a judgment or 
from any other legal or judicial process or remedy, … the Republic has irrevocably agreed not to claim and has 
irrevocably waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction (and consents 
generally for the purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to the giving of any relief or the issue of any 
process in connection with any Related Proceeding or Related Judgment). 
A waiver “must give a clear, complete, unambiguous and unmistakable manifestation of the 
sovereign’s intent to waive immunity.”
2
 However, through the phrasing of Argentina’s FAA, we may notice 
some ambiguities and unclear manifestation of the intent to waive its sovereign immunity. Thus, we can notice 
that this FAA did not provide a clear waiver of sovereign enforcement immunity as required by customary 
international law although it provides for jurisdictional immunity. Additionally, assuming that this FAA 
established the Argentina’s consent to jurisdiction, its consent to enforcement measures is still needed since 
consent to measures of enforcement cannot be found from consent to jurisdiction. Moreover, apart Articles 18 
and 19 of the UNCSI provide methods of prejudgment and post-judgment constraint to be followed, Article 21 
of the Convention provides for immunity for non-commercial and related military property and the ARA 
Libertad can be regarded as such. 
Argentina has strongly resisted this assertion of jurisdiction, claiming that it violates the immunity 
enjoyed by public vessels, which cannot be impliedly waived. Despite all the temptations of Ghana to justify 
decision of its domestic High Court on the issue of Argentina’s waiver of the jurisdictional and enforcement 
measures, the Tribunal completely ignored the issue of whether Argentina’s FAA had waived sovereign 
immunity. This cautionary behavior of the tribunal may be understood on the sense that it does not want to make 
the same mistake like the Ghanain High Court by relying on the 2004 UNSCI since none of the disputing State 
ratified this Convention. Obviously, this consideration may justify the ITLOS’s reluctance to rely on that 
Convention. The reliance on a treaty which hasn’t a binding force by the Tribunal can be considered as a wasting 
time and may lead to considerable fault since one could be doubtful about the credibility of its decision. Even if 
implied consent to waiver is possible according to a few legal documents
3
, the tribunal has played a wise role in 
skipping this issue. So, ITLOS has succeeded in avoiding any reliance, interpretation or application of the 2004 
Convention.  Also, the ITLOS had limited its role on the interpretation and the application of UNCLOS. But, can 
we admit that this interpretation has been conducted under VCLT’s Article 31? 
According to Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
4
 a treaty must be 
interpreted ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose’. Thus, the ‘context’ of Article 32 can be summarized under these terms ‘the 
Libertad is in Ghanain internal water for an official visit in peace time’. The ‘object’ can be understood as the 
‘LIBERTAD, an Argentinian military navy (warship) which is supposed to enjoy immunity’ and the ‘purpose’ 
here can be accepted as ‘enforcement measures through this Argentinian property in Ghana by a Ghanain Court. 
Therefore, although such a ship is in Ghana internal waters, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘nothing in this 
convention’ except the Argentineans warship from enforcement measure in Ghana. Then, a prompt release 
sounds well in this case. And consequently, we can say that ITLOS didn’t go beyond its interpretative role in this 
case. 
 
 
                                                           
1 See Peter-Tobias Stoll, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, STATE IMMUNITY, Op cit. 
2 quamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Libra Bank Ltd. v. 
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 676 F.2d 47,49 (2d Cir. 1982). 
3 Only United State Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (Section 1610(a)(1) , the Canada State Immunity Act(Section 12(1)(a)) 
and the ILA’s Draft Articles (Art. III(A) (1)) allows for an implied waiver 
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155 331, 8 ILM (1969) 679. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)   ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.37, 2015 
 
13 
5. CONCLUSION 
Sovereign State Immunity is an old principle recognize as customary international law. Through many national 
laws, regional laws and the 2004 UN Convention, international community expresses their will to protect 
sovereign properties as long as they are not committed to commercial purposes. UNCLOS also enshrined this 
assumption or understanding of Sovereign States Immunity on non commercial properties. But, with the 
interpretation given by ITLOS to Article 32 in Libertad case, we can see that unlike to other legislations 
UNCLOS give an absolute immunity to this category of States’ properties. And this finding seems to be on line 
with Chief Justice John Marsall’s argument in the US Supreme Court on the appeal of the Schooner Exchange 
case. He observed that although international law dictated that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own 
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute’, the principle of sovereign equality discouraged one sovereign 
from standing in judgment of another.
1
 
This interpretation has to be taken into consideration by international investors while dealing with 
States because from the Libertad case, we may draw lesson that State Sovereignty can be neutralized by another 
Sovereign State immunity of a warship wherever on the Sea. Therefore State’s warship has no border limit on 
the Sea. And any arrest of such a property for enforcement measure can be defeated by a provisional measure 
regardless of the issue of waiver if the arresting States and defendant States are parties to UNCLOS. As far as it 
concerns the issue of waiver of a sovereign State immunity, investors may ensure that the provisions are very 
clear, without any interpretation ambiguities while contracting agreement with sovereign States. Another lesson 
to learn from this case concerns Argentina’s tactic to seize ITLOS’s jurisdiction. This tactic has consisted in 
quickly amending its article 298 declaration on October 26
th
 (four days before instituting its first legal action 
under Annex VII of the LOS Convention) to remove its early rejection of the LOS Convention’s compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures with respect to “military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in 
noncommercial service.”
2
 
Thus, the tactic of Argentina to seize the jurisdiction of ITLOS under Annex VII tribunal seems to give 
hope to the States which are not party to UNCLOS yet, that they don’t need to rush. They can wait until their 
non commercial property has been threatened. Nice strategy may be! But as long as a party can exclude many 
things from the jurisdiction of UNCLOS and accepts them when its interests are threatened, we think that States 
can also think about securing their rights in standing for inserting ‘Anti-Ambush jurisdiction’
3
 into their 
acceptance of UNCLOS’s jurisdiction like some States do while accepting ICJ’s jurisdiction. 
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